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The Correct-Like Decision in United
States v. Martignon
By David Patton ∗
INTRODUCTION
When United States District Judge Harold Baer, Jr., struck
down the federal anti-bootlegging act 1 last year in United States v.
Martignon, 2 he repeatedly employed a term to describe the law—
“copyright-like”—that
has
provoked
much
criticism.
Commentators have criticized the phrasing as either imprecise, 3
nonsensical, 4 or merely insufficient as a basis for striking down the
statute. 5 And a federal court in California, in disagreeing with the
holding of Martignon, specifically noted that use of the term was
“not particularly helpful.” 6
Judge Baer, however, was not the first to use the term
“copyright-like,” and he will likely not be the last. Seemingly
vague descriptions of laws as “copyright-like” or “quasicopyright” are sure to appear in future opinions as courts evaluate
congressional authority to pass a new generation of untraditional
intellectual property statutes. In addition to the bootlegging
∗ The author is a staff attorney at the Federal Defenders of New York and an adjunct
professor at New York University School of Law. He represents Jean Martignon in
United States v. Martignon.
1
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
2
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
3
Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Am. Publishers, et al. at 20, United States. v.
Martignon, 175 F.3d 1269 (2d Cir. May 12, 2005) (No. 04-5649-cr).
4
Hugh Hansen et al., Panel III: United States v. Martignon—Case in Controversy, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223 (2006) (William Patry, panelist).
5
See Brian Danitz, Martignon and KISS Catalog: Can Live Performances Be
Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1181 (2005).
6
Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
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context, the terms have also recently appeared in opinions
weighing the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”). 7 The anti-bootlegging statute and the DMCA,
share important features that precipitated the use of the
terminology: they both regulate in the field of intellectual
property, but do so in ways novel to traditional American
intellectual property legislation, and they were both passed in
response to world trade agreements entered into by the United
States. The new laws move the United States closer to embracing
a “neighboring rights” view of intellectual property heretofore
more closely associated with European law. But along with this
trend, have come questions about the scope of congressional
authority in creating these new rights.
When Judge Baer struck down the federal anti-bootlegging
statute as unconstitutional, the decision sparked heated debate
about the scope of the Copyright Clause and the enumerated
powers of Congress.
The primary questions presented in
Martignon were (1) whether the statute violated the Copyright
Clause by its vesting of exclusive rights in non-“Writings,” i.e.,
live musical performances; (2) whether it violated the Copyright
Clause by granting those rights in perpetuity; and (3) if so, whether
Congress could nonetheless enact such legislation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, irrespective of the Copyright Clause’s
limitations.
The Government took the position that the bootlegging statute
falls entirely outside the scope of the Copyright Clause precisely
because it regulates non-writings, and that when Congress grants
exclusive rights to performers it does so within its authority under
the Commerce Clause, free of any conflict with the Copyright
Clause. In so arguing, the Government relied heavily on the
differences between the anti-bootlegging statute and the rights
conferred by the Copyright Act. Its basic premise was that the
bootlegging statute is separate and distinct from copyright law;
instead, it is a commercial regulation passed to comply with the
United States’ treaty obligations.
7
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)).
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Mr. Martignon, on the other hand, contended that the statute
falls squarely within the scope of the Copyright Clause since it
regulates “the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor,” 8
and that it violates the proscriptions of the clause by granting
exclusive rights to authors of non-“Writings” and for time
immemorial. He further argued that Congress may not avoid those
proscriptions by reliance on the Commerce Clause. Here, Mr.
Martignon relied heavily on the ways in which the statute is similar
to traditional copyright legislation in the rights it provides to
authors, but different in its failure to provide the same traditional
safeguards to the beneficiaries of the public domain.
In his opinion holding for Mr. Martignon, Judge Baer
repeatedly referred to the statute as “copyright-like legislation,” 9
and he concluded that “Congress may not enact copyright-like
legislation, such as the anti-bootlegging statute, under the
commerce clause (or any other clause) when the legislation
conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the Copyright
Clause.” 10
This phraseology incited considerable criticism.
Indeed, one of the leading experts on copyright law and the author
of the statute, William Patry, said of it: “The idea that it could be
‘copyright-like’ I don=t quite get either. You are pregnant or you
are not pregnant. Either it is a Copyright Clause or it is not a
Copyright Clause. It can’t be ‘copyright-like.’”11 While I confess
to being a bigger fan of Judge Baer’s opinion than Mr. Patry, I find
his criticism on this score valid—to a certain extent.
Below, I discuss the terms “copyright-like” and “quasicopyright” and demonstrate that prior to Martignon, courts had
typically used the terms in reference to a law’s similarity (or
dissimilarity) to the Copyright Act; whereas in Martignon the term
was also used in reference to the Copyright Clause. While this
usage in Martignon may have been somewhat imprecise, I suggest
that the classification of a law as “copyright-like” is ultimately
unimportant to the determination of whether the bootlegging
statute is constitutional. The constitutionality of the statute
8
9
10
11

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 passim (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 425.
Hansen, supra note 4 (William Patry, panelist).
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depends not on how it is broadly categorized but on its actual
effects, i.e., the rights it confers and the subject matter of those
rights. The Copyright Clause itself does not mention the word
“copyright;” instead it speaks of “exclusive rights” granted “for
limited times” to “Authors” for their “Writings.” 12
When
analyzing how those terms have been interpreted by the Supreme
Court, it becomes clear that the bootlegging statute falls squarely
within the scope of the Copyright Clause and that Judge Baer’s
conclusion is well supported despite his terminology. While
“copyright-like” and “quasi-copyright” may provide useful
shorthands for describing the increasing number of non-traditional
laws regulating intellectual property, the terms themselves do not
answer any of the fundamental questions at issue; they merely beg
them.
I. MOGHADAM, RAILWAY LABOR AND MARTIGNON
In 1994, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the
unauthorized recording and transmission of live musical
performances and the subsequent copying or distribution of such
“bootleg” recordings. 13 Prior to this legislation, prohibitions on
“bootlegging” 14 had been left to individual states, the majority of

12
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress has the power . . . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
13
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
14
A bootleg album or compact disc is an unauthorized recording of a live musical
performance that is not generally commercially available. Bootlegs are distinguishable
from counterfeit or pirated albums, which contain copyrighted content that has been
previously recorded and distributed. See Lee H. Russo, The Criminalization of
Bootlegging: Unnecessary and Unwise, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 172 (2002). A
“counterfeit” recording mimics an official release in its entirety, down to its packaging
and trademarks and are “duplicates of commercially released albums intended to look
like the original.” Dawn R. Maynor, Just Let the Music Play: How Classic Bootlegging
Can Buoy the Drowning Music Industry, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 173, 175 (2002). A
“pirated” recording also contains commercially released material but without mimicking
the entire content or packaging of the official product. See The Recording Industry
Association of America (“RIAA”), Anti-Piracy News and Issues page,
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) (definitions for
bootleg, counterfeit, and piracy promulgated by RIAA).
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which prohibited unauthorized recordings. 15 The federal statute
was passed in response to the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade negotiations, which included the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”), to which the
United States was a signatory. 16 There is almost a complete dearth
of legislative history related to the passage of the statute because it
was passed using “fast-track” procedures which did not allow for
amendment or debate. 17
The statute went unchallenged until 1997 when Ali Moghadam
was charged in the Middle District of Florida with distributing
bootleg compact discs. 18 He challenged the statute as violating the
Copyright Clause because it granted exclusive rights to the authors
of non-“Writings.” The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Mr.
Moghadam, ultimately finding that Congress maintained authority
to pass the statute under its Commerce Clause powers even
assuming that the statute fell outside the scope of congressional
authority under the Copyright Clause (a point the government had
conceded). In so doing, however, the Court was required to
resolve “the tension” 19 between its holding and that in Railway
Labor Executives’ Association v. Gibbons. 20
In Railway Labor, the Supreme Court addressed the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause and whether Congress could
pass a non-uniform bankruptcy law under its Commerce Clause
powers. 21 The issue arose in 1980 when Congress enacted the
Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assist Act
(“RITA”) requiring a debtor railroad company in bankruptcy
proceedings to pay $75 million to its former employees. 22 The
15

See Keith V. Lee, Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent in the
Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute in United States v. Moghadam, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 327, n.29 (2000) (finding that 30 states and the District of Columbia have antibootlegging statutes).
16
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, Art. 14, Sec. 5, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); see also,
Maynor, supra note 14, at 187 (2002).
17
Id.
18
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
19
Id. at 1279.
20
455 U.S. 457 (1982).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 459–62.
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trustee sued, arguing that RITA violated the Bankruptcy Clause’s
uniformity requirement by giving preferential treatment to the
debtor=s former employees. 23
Defenders of the statute asserted that RITA was a type of labor
law authorized by the Commerce Clause and “not a law on the
subject of bankruptcies.” 24 Therefore, they argued, the law was
not subject to the limitations of the Bankruptcy Clause, namely the
“uniformity” requirement, and that Congress was free to exercise
its authority under the Commerce Clause. The Court rejected that
characterization, found that the law in question was indeed a
“bankruptcy” law within the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause, and
struck down the statute. 25 The holding turned on whether the law
principally governed Congress’ regulation of the labor rights of
workers employed in the field of interstate transportation, or
whether it instead primarily regulated the rights and obligations of
creditors and debtors. In finding the latter, the Court emphasized
that the rights created by RITA lay at the core of bankruptcy law
and fell within the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause. 26
The Moghadam court acknowledged that Railway Labor
constrained congressional power to act pursuant to a general grant
of authority (the Commerce Clause) where another more specific
grant of authority (the Bankruptcy Clause) contained limitations.
In Moghadam, however, the court found that this was the case only
in “some circumstances” and that “the instant case is not one such
circumstance.” 27 In the context of the anti-bootlegging statute, the
court found that the statute was “not fundamentally inconsistent”
with the fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause.28 Rather,
according to Moghadam, “the Copyright Clause does not envision
that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-

23

Id. at 463; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to enact
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”).
24
Brief of Respondent-Appellee, Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons, 645 F.2d 74
(1980) (Nos. 80-415, 80-1239), 1981 WL 390398.
25
Railway Labor, 455 U.S. at 466–72.
26
Id.
27
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999).
28
Id.
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like protection under other constitutional clauses, such as the
Commerce Clause. . . .” 29
Throughout the opinion, the Moghadam court variously
referred to the anti-bootlegging statute as “quasi-copyright” 30 and
“copyright-like” 31 owing to its creation of “hybrid rights that in
some ways resemble the protections of copyright law but in other
ways are distinct from them.” 32 In so categorizing the statute, the
court noted that the bootlegging statute did not confer the same
exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act and that it was
unclear whether many of copyright law’s related doctrines such as
fair use and work-for-hire applied to the bootlegging context. 33
The court ultimately concluded that “extending quasi-copyright
protection to unfixed live musical performances is in no way
inconsistent with the Copyright Clause, even if that Clause itself
does not directly authorize such protection.” 34
Notably, however, the Moghadam court explicitly reserved
judgment on whether the statute was fundamentally inconsistent
with the “Limited Times” requirement of the Copyright Clause
because Mr. Moghadam failed to preserve the issue for appeal.
Though not ruling on it, the Court nonetheless gave its opinion that
the issue was, at the very least, problematic: “On its face, the
protection created by the anti-bootlegging statute is apparently
perpetual and contains no express time limit; therefore
phonorecords of live musical performances would presumably
never fall into the public domain.” 35
Four years after the Eleventh Circuit=s decision, in United
States v. Martignon, 36 Judge Baer was presented with the issue left
undecided in Moghadam. In 2003, Jean Martignon was charged
with violating the anti-bootlegging statute by selling bootleg
compact discs from his record store in New York City. He
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1281.
346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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challenged the constitutionality of the statute as violating both the
“Writings” and “Limited Times” requirements of the Copyright
Clause. 37 Judge Baer seized upon the “copyright-like” language in
Moghadam and expanded upon its importance in determining
whether the statute was constitutional by stating that the first step
in his analysis was to categorize the statute as either “a copyright
law or a commercial regulation.” 38 He concluded the first part of
his analysis by finding that, “[b]ased on the anti-bootlegging
statute’s language, history, and placement, it is clearly a copyrightlike regulation.” 39 He then determined that the Copyright Clause
did not empower Congress to pass the statute because it failed to
meet both the “Writings” and “Limited Times” requirements. 40
Lastly, he found that the limitations of the Copyright Clause
constrained congressional authority generally such that Congress
could not enact the statute pursuant to some other grant of
authority like the Commerce Clause. 41 Here, Judge Baer elevated
the importance of the “copyright-like” terminology, by holding,
“Congress may not enact copyright-like legislation, such as the
anti-bootlegging, under the commerce clause (or any other clause),
when the legislation conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the
Copyright Clause.”
Critics of the decision in Martignon have consistently attacked
Judge Baer’s use of the term “copyright-like.” The Government in
its appeal to the Second Circuit argued that by comparing the
bootlegging statute to the bankruptcy statute in Railway Labor the
Martignon court was making a fundamental error because RITA
was not a “bankruptcy-like” statute. 42 Rather, the statute “directly
created rules for a specific bankruptcy case.” 43 In their amicus
curiae for the Government’s position, the Association of American
Publishers, et al., charged that “the court below does not explain
what is meant by the phrase ‘copyright-like.’ Insofar as the
37

Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 419.
39
Id. at 422.
40
Id. at 424.
41
Id. at 428.
42
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2d
Cir. May 12, 2005) (No. 04-5649-cr).
43
Id.
38
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decision below turns on the ‘copyright-like’ character of antibootlegging protection, the imprecision of that term is an
additional reason for rejecting that court’s decision.” 44 As noted
above, the author of the statute, William Patry, stated in this panel
discussion that “[t]he idea that it could be ‘copyright-like’ I don’t
quite get either. You are pregnant or you are not pregnant. Either
it is a Copyright Clause or it is not a Copyright Clause. It can’t be
‘copyright-like.’” 45 Also, at least one member of the Second
Circuit panel sitting at the oral argument, asked the Government
whether there was any precedent for the use of the term, to which
the Government responded in the negative. 46
More recently, a court in the Central District of California
disagreed with Martignon in upholding the civil analogue to the
anti-bootlegging statute.
In KISS Catalog v. Passport
47
International Productions, the court, upon reconsideration after
intervention by the United States, found the reasoning of
Moghadam persuasive, and with respect to the copyright-like
language of Martignon, found that “this characterization, even if
valid, is not particularly helpful. As the United States points out,
nothing prohibits Congress from protecting similar things in
different ways—so long as some provision of the United States
Constitution allows it to do so.” 48
II. “COPYRIGHT-LIKE”
Debate over the bootlegging statute is not the only arena in
which the term “copyright-like” has been employed. Most
frequently, it has arisen in the context of federal preemption of
state laws which have features of copyright law. Section 301(a) of
the Copyright Act preempts any “legal or equitable rights [under
state law] that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106 in works of
44

Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Am. Publishers et al., supra note 3.
Hansen, supra note 4 (William Patry, panelist).
46
Transcript of Oral Argument, Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2d Cir. July 12,
2005) (No. 04-5649-cr).
47
405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
48
Id. at 1174.
45
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authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by §§ 102
and 103.” 49 Section 301 has resulted in a number of challenges to
various state laws governing unfair competition and rights of
publicity. In one such case, Pivot Point v. Charlene Products,
Judge Easterbrook (sitting by designation as a district court judge),
found that a state law unfair competition claim was preempted by
the Copyright Act but also acknowledged that under different
circumstances some “copyright-like” state claims might stand. 50
The term has also been used in evaluating the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). 51 The DMCA was passed
in 1998 in response to the United States’ adoption of the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty. The DMCA
prohibits, inter alia, the distribution of certain “anticircumvention” technologies, i.e., technologies that allow persons
to circumvent restrictions encrypted on digital copyrighted
materials. In 2001, Elcom, a company that sold software making it
possible for consumers to lift restrictions placed on books sold in
digital format, was indicted under the criminal provisions of the
DMCA. In United States v. Elcom Ltd., 52 the court addressed a
variety of constitutional challenges raised by Elcom, including a
Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge, First Amendment
challenges to the statute’s restrictions on speech and expression,
and a Copyright Clause challenge to congressional authority to
enact the statute. While the court dismissed all of Elcom’s
challenges, it relied heavily on, and quoted liberally from,
Moghadam in addressing the copyright challenge. Employing
Moghadam’s “fundamentally inconsistent” test, the Elcom court
upheld the DMCA, rejecting, among other arguments, Elcom’s
contention “that Congress’ ban on the sale of circumvention tools

49

17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
170 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see also Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d
905 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Illinois’ right of publicity statute was not preempted by
the Copyright Act but noting that states may not create “copyright-like” protections that
conflict with federal copyright law).
51
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
52
203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
50

PATTON_ARTICLE_091706_CLEAN

2006]

MARTIGNON’S CORRECT-LIKE DECISION

9/17/2006 6:14:37 PM

1297

has the effect of allowing publishers to claim copyright-like
protection in public domain works . . .” 53
The common thread running throughout these pre-Martignon
opinions, is their use of the term “copyright-like” in reference to a
statute’s similarities and differences with the Copyright Act. The
preemption cases do so explicitly by referring to Section 301 of the
Copyright Act, which asserts federal supremacy over all things
“equivalent” to copyright. The court in Elcom did so by its heavy
reliance on Moghadam and its ultimate conclusion that the
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions did not extend any of the
rights granted by the Copyright Act, i.e., the “exclusive rights to
reproduce, and distribute copies of an original work of authorship,
to make derivative works, and to perform the work publicly, for a
limited time.” 54
And finally, the court in Moghadam explained in detail what it
meant when describing the anti-bootlegging statute as conferring
“hybrid rights” that were best described as “quasi-copyright or sui
generis protections.” 55 The court listed the rights granted by § 106
of the Copyright Act and noted that the anti-bootlegging statute did
not confer all of those same rights. 56 It also noted the uncertainty
of whether copyright concepts like fair use, work-for-hire, limited
duration, and the statute of limitations were applicable to the antibootlegging statute. 57
In Martignon, however, the court, at times, used the term
“copyright-like” in a decidedly different manner, and it is this
usage that has fueled many of the opinion’s critics. In addition to
using the term “copyright-like” to describe the anti-bootlegging
statute’s relationship to the rights conferred by the Copyright Act,
the Martignon court also used the term to describe the statute in
relation to the subject matter of the Copyright Clause.
Whether the bootlegging statute falls within the scope of the
Copyright Clause is virtually determinative of whether the statute
53
Id. at 1141; see also 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1117–18).
54
Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
55
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 1999).
56
Id.
57
Id.
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is constitutional. 58 If, as the United States argues, the statute falls
outside the scope of the Copyright Clause because it regulates non“Writings,” then it is easy to see why Congress could validly
exercise its Commerce Clause powers to enact it. If the regulation
of live performances and the resulting recordings of those
performances is something separate and apart from the subject
matter regulated by the Copyright Clause, then nothing in the
Copyright Clause would restrain congressional action; and if
another clause, such as the Commerce Clause, provides Congress
with the power to regulate performances, then Congress may do so,
uninhibited by the limitations of the Copyright Clause.
If, however, the anti-bootlegging statute regulates subject
matter that falls within the scope of the Copyright Clause, it is easy
to see why Congress would be constrained by the limitations
imposed therein, regardless of additional grants of power such as
the Commerce Clause that might otherwise provide Congress with
the authority to enact the law. Here, Railway Labor is dispositive:
Congress may not resort to other more general grants of authority
to do what is forbidden by a more specific constitutional limitation.
The Martignon court, by classifying the statute as “copyrightlike,” largely by reference to its similarity to the Copyright Act,
while also using the term “copyright-like” to refer to that which
falls within the scope of the Copyright Clause, gave near
dispositive weight to the classification. While the classification
can be instructive, it should not be dispositive, and here, the critics
are right to question the terminology. The holding in Martignon,
however, remains sound because the bootlegging statute does
indeed fall within the scope of the Copyright Clause.
III. MARTIGNON WAS RIGHTLY DECIDED
The bootlegging statute prohibits a variety of conduct,
including the unauthorized copying of live musical performances
and the subsequent copying or distribution of those recordings.
58

But see Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004) (writer argues that the constraints of the Copyright Clause
should not prohibit Congress from acting pursuant to its other grants of authority).
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Mr. Martignon challenged the statute as violating the Copyright
Clause in two ways: (1) by violating the “Writings” requirement;
and (2) by violating the “Limited Times” requirement.
The first challenge is perhaps the more difficult of the two to
resolve as it relies not purely on the text of the Copyright Clause
but also on its history and accepted meaning. Prior to the
enactment of the bootlegging statute, Congress had never granted
exclusive intellectual property rights to something not fixed in
some sort of tangible form. “Writings” has been interpreted to
cover a host of tangible items, including photographs, 59 graphic
and sculptural art 60 and audiovisual works, 61 but never to live
performances. 62 Any regulation of performances had always been
left to the States, the majority of which prohibited bootlegging. 63
The United States, relying on the fact that performances are not
“Writings,” argued that the bootlegging statute simply falls outside
the realm of the Copyright Clause and thus Congress is free to use
its Commerce Clause powers free of the Copyright Clause
restraints. Mr. Martignon’s response was that “Writings” does not
mark the subject matter of the Copyright Clause; rather it imposes
a limitation on congressional authority when it regulates within the
scope of the Copyright Clause. And Congress acts within the
scope of the Clause whenever it grants exclusive rights to the
Authors of original works that are the fruits of creative or
intellectual labor 64 —whether in tangible form or not.
The second challenge to the statute—the “Limited Times”
challenge—is more straightforward. Here, the United States can no
longer rely on its argument that because the statute regulates non“Writings,” it falls outside the scope of the Copyright Clause. The
59

Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1883).
See, e.g., Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983)
(distinguishing between useful and artistic goods); Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (same).
61
See, e.g., WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622,
628 (7th Cir. 1982).
62
See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995)
(“No respectable interpretation of the word ‘writings’ embraces an untaped performance
of someone singing at Carnegie Hall.”).
63
Lee, supra note 15, at n.29.
64
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
60
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statute, in addition to regulating non-“Writings” by prohibiting the
recording of heretofore unrecorded performances, also regulates
the subsequent copying and distribution of those recordings.
Those tangible recordings are certainly “Writings” by any
definition of the term. 65 And the bootlegging statute’s perpetual
prohibition on the distribution of those recordings without the
performer=s consent is fatal. 66
The Martignon court was correct to follow the example of
Railway Labor when it looked to a variety of sources in
determining whether the statute fell within the scope of the
Copyright Clause.
In Railway Labor, the Supreme Court
examined the nature of the statute at issue, RITA, and its
legislative history in determining that it was indeed a law that fell
within the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause. Judge Baer, in
noting the anti-bootlegging statute’s language, its similarity to the
Copyright Act, and its legislative history grounded in a treaty on
intellectual property matters, did the same when he examined what
sort of rights were being created by the anti-bootlegging statute.
His ultimate conclusion that “Congress may not enact
copyright-like legislation, such as the anti-bootlegging statute,
under the commerce clause (or any other clause) when the
legislation conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the
Copyright Clause,” is well-supported when one understands that
by “copyright-like” he is referring to that which falls within the
scope of the Copyright Clause.
The holding and the terminology are further supported by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. 67 In Dastar, the Court held that a provision of the
65

Some have argued that the recordings are not “Writings” because they were created
without authorization, noting that the definition of fixation in the Copyright Act requires
the “authority of the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The argument fails because it
conflates the Copyright Act’s definition of fixation with the constitutional definition of
“Writings” which has never been so constrained. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (defining
a Writing as “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic
labor”).
66
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 196, 198, 208 (2003) (variously referring to
the Copyright Clause’s “Limited Times” language as a “restriction,” “limitation,” and
“constraint” on congressional authority).
67
539 U.S. 23 (2003).
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Lanham Act did not, and more importantly, could not, prevent the
unaccredited copying of an uncopyrightable work. Dastar, a
production company, released a video in which it repackaged an
old television documentary which had fallen into the public
domain after the lapsing of its original copyright. Dastar’s rerelease changed the ordering of the footage and listed itself as the
producer. The original producer of the documentary sued Dastar
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act which creates a cause of
action against anyone who uses in commerce either “a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation” in
connection with “any goods or services.” 68 In dismissing the
claim, the Supreme Court went beyond mere statutory
interpretation of the Lanham Act: it held that allowing such a claim
would “create a species of mutant copyright law,” 69 and was
something that Congress “may not do.” 70
Whether one refers to the anti-bootlegging statute as
“copyright-like,” “quasi-copyright,” or the more sinister “mutant
copyright law,” it falls squarely within the bounds of the Copyright
Clause and the Martignon court was right to strike it down.
IV. NEIGHBORING RIGHTS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Intellectual property rights in the United States have
historically been positive rights handed down by Congress
pursuant to its Copyright Clause powers. 71 The rights conferred by
Congress have been broad, covering a variety of works whose only
common attribute is that they are “original” and have some
“minimal degree of creativity.” 72 The American system stood in
contrast to the traditional European model of natural rights (droit
d’auteur) in which authors enjoy protection only for works of
“high authorship.” 73 The European model reserves a separate

68

Id. at 29.
Id. at 34.
70
Id. at 37 (“To hold otherwise, would be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species
of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.”).
71
See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8E.01 (2004).
72
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
73
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 71.
69
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place for those so-called “neighboring rights” (droit voisins) which
are “similar to those protected by copyright laws . . . but are not
necessarily protected under a nation’s copyright law.” 74 These
neighboring rights most commonly refer “to the rights of
performers, producers of sound recordings, and broadcasters.” 75
In 1994, when Congress implemented the anti-bootlegging
statute in response to the TRIPS accord, the United States for the
first time entered the world of “neighboring rights.” Given this
fundamental break with traditional American intellectual property
jurisprudence, it is no surprise that significant constitutional
questions have arisen. And as the United States continues to enter
into international treaties and agreements on intellectual property,
those same questions will undoubtedly continue to arise.
Equally likely will be the use of various terms such as
“copyright-like” and “quasi-copyright” to describe the newly
created hybrid rights. But the mere description of the newly
created rights as such will not resolve the question of their
constitutional validity. Not all “copyright-like” legislation (in the
Moghadam sense of the term) will necessary fall within the scope
of the Copyright Clause. The related area of trademarks
demonstrates this. The Lanham Act could certainly be viewed as
conferring “copyright-like” protections to the owners of
trademarks in that it grants the owners exclusive rights to use
certain symbols or words. The Supreme Court has held, however,
that trademarks do not fall within the scope of the Copyright
Clause because they do not meet the requirement of originality;
instead they arise out of use or “priority of appropriation” in
relation to a product=s branding. 76 Trademarks thus stand in
contrast to the recordings of live musical performances which are
certainly creative and original under the Supreme Court=s
definition of those terms.
As the bootlegging context shows, the term “copyright-like”
can be used to either support or criticize a statute depending on
74

Stephen Fraser, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules and Roadblocks
on the Global Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 759,
768 (1997).
75
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 71.
76
The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
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whether one emphasizes the similarities or differences between the
new law and traditional notions of copyright. As Congress
continues to pass untraditional intellectual property laws that grant
similar but not identical rights to those found in the Copyright Act,
it will be incumbent upon courts to clarify what is meant by
“copyright-like.” Recognition that a law creates hybrid rights is
only the first step in assessing its constitutional validity.

